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NOTES
pressive of this feeling are the words of Dean Pound: "A man's
feelings are as much a part of personality as his limbs. The
actions that protect the latter from injury may well be made to
protect the former by the ordinary processes of legal growth."47
SAM ELSON, '30.
POWERS OF RECEIVERS APPOINTED IN MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS
It often becomes necessary for a court of equity to appoint a
receiver of mortgaged property pending foreclosure, either to
preserve the corpus of the estate from deterioration, or to se-
quester the rents and profits to make good an anticipated de-
ficiency, or for some other cogent reason. The question which
at times seems perplexing is just how far a court of equity may
go in giving the receiver power over property incident to, but
not covered by the mortgage. In a recent federal case,' a fore-
closure suit to sell mortgaged property and apply the proceed'
to the mortgage debt, the receiver was directed to take charge
of all company property, and to receive the rents, earnings, is-
sues, profits, and income therefrom, although the mortgage did
not cover all the assets of the company. On appeal this direc-
tion in the case was reversed, because though "the court had
power to appoint the receiver-it did not have the power to di-
rect him to take charge of any property not covered by the mort-
gage." Granting that it is often laid down as a concrete rule
that the mortgagee has no equitable right to have the receiver-
ship extended over other property of the mortgagor not em-
braced in the mortgage, 2 still we must not lose sight of the under-
lying reasons for having a receiver. The object of appointing
a receiver is to preserve the property for the benefit of all parties
interested,3 and if this object is best attained by continuing the
business, such procedure has a strong argument in its favor.
Perhaps the primary objection to such an extension of the re-
ceiver's dominion is the hindrance of other creditors of the mort-
gagor from subjecting the property not included in the mortgage
to the payment of their debts. This general doctrine is stated
in Scott v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.,4 an important federal
case, and will be considered later.
"28 HARV. L. REv. 343.
'A. B. Leach & Co. v. Grant (1928), 27F (2d) 201.
'As in 27 Cyc. 1623; Gluck & Becker, RECEIVERS OF CORPORATIONS, p.
281; Smith v. McCullough (1881), 104 U. S. 25.
'Knickerbocker v. McKinley Coal Co. (1898), 172 Ill. 535, 50 N. E. 330,
64 Am. St. Rep. 54.
- (1895), 69 F. 17.
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An interesting development in the law of receiverships has
been the gradual tendency of the courts to enlarge and extend
the powers of receivers. This, however, is merely demonstrative
of the growth of equity itself, for the receiver acts in the ca-
pacity of an officer of the court and is subject to its bidding. The
power to appoint a receiver has always been considered as one
of the inherent rights of a court of equity and has been exercised
from very early times.- A receiver was originally appointed
only with a view to winding up the business of the partnership
or association; it was never contemplated that he should take
charge of the business and continue to conduct it. In Gardner
v. London etc. R. Co.,6 Lord Cairnes tersely stated the then pre-
vailing view in England: "It is impossible to suppose that the
Court of Chancery can make itself or its officer, without any
Parliamentary authority, the hand to execute these powers, and
all the more impossible when it is obvious that there can be no
real correlative responsibility for the consequences of any im-
perfect management." Considering the wide scope of authority
with which railroad receivers are invested today, and the fre-
quency with which courts are called upon to appoint receivers to
operate railroads over extended periods of time, the remarkable
change is easily apparent. This liberal tendency is curbed some-
what, however, with regard to the appointment of a receiver in
behalf of a foreclosing mortgagee. The objective of such an ap-
pointment is the protection of the mortgaged property alone,
and unless it can be accomplished the need of a receiver fails.
7
But from the very nature of the situation the appointment of a
receiver rests in the discretion of the court.8
The early case of Noyes v. Rich was one of the first to dis-
tinguish sharply between the powers of a receiver under a gen-
eral creditors' bill and one appointed in a suit to reach specified
mortgaged property. There it was said that the right of the
mortgagee cannot extend beyond the property mortgaged; and
the right of the receiver must necessarily have the same limita-
'Williamson v. Wilson (1826), 1 Bland (Md.) 420; Folsom v. Evans
(1861), 5 Minn. 338.
(1867), L. R. 2 Ch. App. Cas. 212.
'See Cook, CORPORATIONS, Vol. V, Sec. 862, for specific grounds of ap-
pointment of receiver in mortgage foreclosures against corporations.
8 Parry v. West (Ia., 1924), 197 N. W. 297. The courts are constrained
to be more liberal in the appointment of receivers in the aid of mortgagees
or bondholders of a railroad. High, RECEIVES, Chap. XI, p. 309, says:
"The insolvency of the mortgagor and inadequacy of the mortgage security
may be regarded as sufficient ground for relief. This is the usual principle
governing the application of receivers in aid of the foreclosure of mort-
gages." But ef. Pullan v. Cincinnati etc. R. Co. (1865), 4 Biss. (U. S.) 35;
Rice v. Paul etc. R. Co. (1878), 24 Minn. 464.
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tion. In that case certain specified creditors had a mortgage
lien on part of an insolvent's assets, and perhaps the court was
over-zealous in guarding the right of the other creditors. In
1875 the doctrine of Noyes v. Rich was extended to a railroad
case, State v. Jacksonville etc. R. R. Co.10 In that case a dispute
arose as to the right of a receiver appointed under mortgage
foreclosure to assume control over a branch line. In a lengthy
decision the court finally decided against the receiver on the
ground that "a mortgagee cannot be said to have any equitable
rights looking to receivership in the property of the mortgagor,
beyond that included in the mortgage."
Perhaps this general doctrine was best stated in Scott -v.
Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., supra. A creditor intervened in
mortgage foreclosure proceedings on a railroad, and sought an
order discharging certain land from the custody of the receivers
and granting him leave to sell the same on execution to satisfy
his judgment. The court granted him this relief, basing its
decision on this ground: "A mortgagee has the undoubted right
to subject the mortgaged property to the payment of the mort-
gage debt, to the exclusion of all general creditors of the mort-
gagor and persons holding junior liens thereon; but as to all
property of the debtor not included in the mortgage, the mort-
gagee is in no better plight than if he had no mortgage." Other
important cases upholding this general rule are stated below.,-
In its application, no distinction is made between mortgages on
real property and chattel mortgages. However, a distinction is
apparently made between private corporations and public cor-
porations, particularly railroads, where the public interest is
concerned and where a public duty is owed to furnish trans-
portation. Whether the extended powers of a receiver of a
public corporation are justified is certainly a matter open for
(1862), 52 Me. 115.
(1875), 15 Fla. 201, 280.
"Smith v. McCullough (1881), 104 U. S. 25; St. Louis A. etc. R. Co. v.
Whitaker (1887), 68 Tex. 630, 5 S. W. 448; State v. Union Bank (1896),
145 Ind. 537, 44 N. E. 585, 57 Am. St. Rep. 209; Central Trust Co. v. Wor-
cester Cycle Mfg. Co. (1902), 114 F. 659; Price v. Howsen (1924), 197 Ia.
324, 197 N. W. 62; also see Gluck & Becker, RECEIVERS OF CoRPoRATIONs, p.
231. An interesting situation arose in Thomas v. Armstrong (1915), 51
Ok. 203, 151 P. 689, L. R. A. (1916B) 1182. A mortgage was given for
an undivided one-half interest in a printing plant. The property was of
such a nature that it was impossible of division into aliquot parts. It
was there said: "Granting that the court had power to appoint a receiver,
it had not power to appoint a receiver for all the property of defendants
within this state when the property involved was a one-half interest. The
court was without jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to take charge of
property which was not involved in the litigation."
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debate. We can easily conceive numerous objections to allow-
ing a court of equity to assume through its officers unhampered
control of great railroads.
In considering over what property the power of a receiver ap-
pointed in mortgage foreclosure proceedings should extend, it is
important that we first distinguish such a receivership from
those instituted by general creditors of a business or by stock-
holders in a corporation. Where the debtor is insolvent and a
receiver is appointed on application of creditors, the theory on
which the aid of the court is invoked is that such procedure will
result in the greatest ultimate benefit for all the parties con-
cerned. The creditors will derive a greater percentage of their
claims or perhaps recover them entirely, and the business of the
debtor will not be destroyed by bankruptcy proceedings. The
courts are quite hesitant about appointing a receiver even on the
application of general creditors, particularly for a corporation. 12
Creditors of a corporation are not entitled to the appointment
of a receiver as a matter of absolute right, unless by statutory
provision. And even under statute, the matter has generally
been addressed to the sound discretion of the court.18 So or-
dinarily creditors of an insolvent debtor or corporation must
resort to the often unsatisfactory remedies provided by law.
When a receiver is appointed in such cases, however, it is only
natural that the receivership should extend over all the property
of the business or corporation. This is also true where the re-
ceivership is instituted by stockholders in a corporation, for
their attack is usually against the officers of the company for
mismanagement of its affairs. The position of the mortgagee or
bondholder who applies for a receiver is somewhat different
from that of the creditor or stockholder, insofar as his right
against the debtor is limited to specified property. But where
both the mortgagee and mortagor will benefit by allowing a re-
ceiver to carry on the business of the mortgagor, as, for instance,
where the value of the mortgaged property is insufficient to se-
cure the debt, it seems that the rigid rule of Scott v. Farmers'
Loan and Trust Co. should recognize an exception. That there
has been a tendency-in this direction cannot be denied.
The comparatively recent case of First National Bank v. De-
troit Trust Co.14 recognizes the power of a court of equity to ap-
" The mere fact that a corporation is insolvent does not constitute ground
for appointment of a receiver. Luhrig Collieries Co. v. Interstate Coal
and Dock Co. (1922), 281 F. 265. But by statute in some states a receiver
may be appointed if a corporation is insolvent or in imminent danger of
insolvency. Adler v. Campeche Laguira Corp. (1919), 257 F. 789.
"Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen (1922), 279 F. 488, overruled on another
point, 261 U. S. 491.(1918), 248 F. 16.
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point a receiver in foreclosure proceedings, with authority to
continue the business of the mortgagor. "Although this power
is one which is cautiously exercised, yet the court may in its dis-
cretion grant such relief when such a course seems necessary
to preserve the property or secure a more advantageous dispo-
sition." In the First National Bank case a bill was brought to
foreclose a mortgage on the property of a lumber company. It
appeared that if the property were ordered sold on foreclosure
its full value would not be realized, and the proceeds would be
entirely absorbed by the first mortgage. The first and second
mortgagees and a majority of those secured by the third mort-
gage all requested or assented to the appointment of a receiver,
with authority to continue the business. Of course there is
great doubt whether such a conclusion would have been reached
if all the mortgagees had not consented to such a proposal. In
granting the order the court proceeded on the same theory as in
general receiverships, viz., continuance of operation was neces-
sary to preserve the property. 5
The problem of when a managing receivership is proper is so
closely identified with the question of allowing a receiver under
foreclosure proceedings to assume control over property only
incident to the mortgage that they may be considered in the
same light. It has been stated as an orthodox rule"o that a
managing receivership is never undertaken except with the view
to winding up the affairs of the company and a sale of its prop-
erty, the business being taken over and continued in order that
the whole may be disposed of in the end as a going concern.
The tendency, however, is to relax this rule.17 It is not difficult
to conceive of situations where a court might be prompted by
other considerations, even more forceful, in appointing a re-
ceiver to carry on a business. One of the reasons why a receiver
is appointed so readily in a suit against a railroad is the diffi-
cult problem of selling to advantage the railroad itself or the
company's equity therein on execution.
The liberal tendency of the courts is shown in a comparison
of two United States Supreme Court cases, Cowdrey v. Gal-
veaton, Houston etc., R. R. (1876), 18 and Cake v. Mohun
(1896). 1' In the former case it was held that a receiver is not
authorized, without the previous direction of the court, to incur
any expenses on account of property in his hand, beyond what is
The doctrine of the First National Bank case is enunciated in 34 Cyc.
284, and is affirmed as to the court's power in foreclosure proceedings in 27
Cyc. 1631.
Gutterson & Gould v. Lebanon Iron & Steel Co. (1907), 151 F. 72.
"Cook, CoRPoRATIONs, Sec. 862.
98 U. S. 352.
164 U. S. 311.
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absolutely essential to its preservation and use, as contemplated
by his appointment. Accordingly, the expenditures of a receiver
to defeat a proposed subsidy from a city to aid in the construc-
tion of a railroad parallel with the one in his hands, were held
properly disallowed in the settlement of his final account, al-
though such road, if constructed, might have diminished the
future earnings of the road in his charge. It was said in Cake
V. Mohun:
"Admitting to its fullest extent the general proposition
laid down by this court in Cowdrey, v. Galveston, Houston etc.
R. R., that a receiver has no authority, as such, to continue
and carry on the business of which he is appointed receiver,
there is a discretion on the part of the court to permit this
to be done temporarily when the interests of the parties seem
to require it. Under such circumstances, the power of the
receiver to incur obligations for supplies and materials
incidental to the business follows as a necessary incident to
the receivership."
It is hardly to be disputed that a receiver in foreclosure pro-
ceedings may, where it is of advantage to the parties, be author-
ized to carry on the business even of a private corporation.20
But generally where such an appointment is made, the mortgage
covers all the property of the corporation. The problem would
be far more difficult where the mortgage did not cover all its as-
sets. Ordinarily in such a case the mortgagee or bondholders
would be forced to institute foreclosure proceedings by suit. But
where the mortgage covers practically all the assets of the com-
pany, and the security would plainly prove inadequate on fore-
closure, would it be within the power of the court to install a
managing receivership? In the case of a railroad, where the
mortgage covered all the rolling-stock, or all the trackage and
other property except the rolling-stock, the court might be forced
to appoint such a receiver on the ground of practical necessity.
By agreement of all interested parties, mortgagor, first, second,
and other mortgagees, and other lien holders, a managing re-
ceiver might be appointed even for a private corporation or
business as in the First National Bank case. 2' The case of
'Pacific Northwest Packing Co. v. Allen (1918), 109 F. 16.
"See Makeel v. Hotchkiss (1901), 190 Ill. 311, 60 N. E. 524, 83 Am. St.
Rep. 131. A mortgagee filed a bill to foreclose his mortgage on a hotel. A
receiver was appointed by the consent of two other persons, who each
claimed the equity of redemption. Although granting that courts of equity
have the power to continue a business under a receiver and make his charges
and expenses a charge upon the property, it was added that this power
must be exercised with great caution.
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Leader Publishing Co. v. Grant Trust Co. 22 is interesting in this
connection. This was a suit by the trustee for holders of bonds
secured by a mortgage on the property of the defendant publish-
ing company to foreclose the mortgage and to procure the ap-
pointment of a receiver for the mortgaged property. The prop-
erty was not of sufficient value to pay the mortgage debt. Said
the court: "In a case such as this where the mortgaged prop-
erty is used for business purposes of such a nature that the dis-
continuation of the business would destroy or greatly impair the
value of the property, the court may authorize the receiver to
carry on the business while he remains in charge." That case
also held that a receiver may be appointed in a foreclosure suit
when the property is not sufficient to discharge the mortgage
debt, even though there is no insolvency.
In appointing receivers for railroad corporations the courts
have been governed by necessities which do not exist in the cases
of other corporations. The law of railroads has had a growth
along separate lines, and that this distinction is proper, par-
ticularly with regard to receiverships, is demonstrated by the
Supreme Court case of Barton v. Barbour.23 The plaintiff sought
to establish a demand against the receiver of an insolvent rail-
road for personal injuries. In the course of its decision, the
court showed how the insolvency of a railroad gives rise to two
different courses of proceeding:(1) The old method, usually applied to banking, insurance,
and manufacturing companies of shutting down and stopping by
injunction all operations and proceedings, taking possession of
the property in the condition it is found at the instant of stop-
page, and selling it for what it will bring at auction.(2) The new method of giving the receiver power to continue
the ordinary operations of the corporation, and as soon as the
interest of all parties having any title to or claim upon the corpus
of the estate will allow, to dispose of it to the best advantage for
all, having due regard to the rights of those who have priority of
claim. The conclusion reached by the court was that the first
method often proved highly injurious and resulted in a total
sacrifice of the property. The cessation of the business of a
railroad for a day would be a public injury. Since railroads
take their rights subject to the rights of the public, they must be
content to enjoy them in subordination thereto. So we see that
the court acts with due regard for the public-that the interests
of the public may not suffer detriment by the nonuser of the
franchises. It might be further remarked that by proceeding in
this manner the interests of creditors are promoted as well as
are those of the public.
1914), 182 Ind. 651, 108 N. E. 121.
S1881), 104 U. S. 126, 135.
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Proceedings for the appointment of receivers in actions for
the foreclosure of railway mortgages are regarded as in rem, to
the extent that they seek to reach such property of the corpora-
tion as was mortgaged to secure the bondholders. 24 Under the
doctrine of Noyes v. Rich the right of the receiver to the posses-
sion of the corporate property, being subject to the same limita-
tions governing the rights of the mortgagee bondholders in
whose behalf he was appointed, should extend only to the specific
property which is the subject of the litigation and covered by
the mortgage. Professor High2' says that a court of equity, hav-
ing appointed a receiver over a railway in an action for the fore-
closure of a mortgage, may exercise all necessary powers with
reference to the protection and preservation of the property for
the benefit of its creditors which are not in excess of the powers
of the corporation itself. Accordingly, it has been held that the
court may authorize the receiver to lease other lines of the rail-
way to be operated in connection with and as part of the road
over which he is appointed when such course is necessary for the
interest of creditors. 26
In considering how far the powers of a receiver appointed
under mortgage foreclosure should extend, it is important to
bear in mind exactly what a mortgage is. The mortgagee has a
right of dominion over the subject of the mortgage, but the
fundamental property right is in the mortgagor, even though it
is contingent. Of course the situation of the parties can be re-
versed or modified by express stipulation of the parties. The
mortgagee has no right, under ordinary circumstances, to look
to any other property of the mortgagor for reimbursement. One
can then hardly question the logic of the holding in Noyes
v. Rich, that since the right of the mortgagees cannot extend be-
yond the property mortgaged, the right of the receiver must nec--
essarily have the same limitation. While this rule is not often
violated, still the courts are far from backward in extending
the powers of the receiver when it is apparent that all interested
parties will ultimately benefit and that they so agree. While the
power of a court of equity as a railroad executive may well be
doubted, the duty owed to the public to furnish constant trans-
portation, and the practical impossibility of realizing the fair
value of the railroad under execution or foreclosure have ap-
parently outweighed this objection. In the cases of receiver-
ships other than railroads the courts have generally followed the
rule of logic as stated above, the few exceptions being based on
the ground of necessity or consent of the interested parties. It
"High, REcEIsVES, p. 309.
Note 24, supra.
Gilbert v. R. R. Co. (1880), 33 Grat. 586.
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is submitted that these exceptions are justified, for it rarely hap-
pens that a foreclosure is carried through to the end without
some concessions by some parties from their strict legal rights,
in order to secure advantages that could not otherwise be at-
tained, and which it is supposed will operate for the general
good of all who are interested.
JOSEPH J. CHusED, '30.
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